DNSSEC
Protect the chain without breaking resolution.
DNSSEC validates a chain from the registrar’s parent DS record to keys and signatures served by the authoritative DNS provider. A mismatched chain can return SERVFAIL even when the zone data is correct.
Terms
DNSKEY
Public signing key published by the authoritative DNS service.
DS
Digest published at the parent through the registrar. It must match the intended child key.
RRSIG
Signature attached to signed record sets.
Validation
A validating resolver checks the complete parent-to-child chain before returning data.
Safe migration sequence
- Inventory the current chain. Record parent DS, child DNSKEY, signature state, and current authoritative nameservers.
- Prove the persistent Help4 signer. Keys, signatures, publisher workflow, rollover, and rollback must survive normal synchronization.
- Choose a controlled transition. Remove an old DS before moving to unsigned DNS, or publish the new matching DS only after the signed child is consistently live.
- Validate every authority. DNSKEY and signed answers must be coherent before relying on recursive tests.
- Verify public validators. Check multiple validating resolvers and watch for SERVFAIL.
Do not copy DS data between domains. Algorithm, digest type, key tag, and digest belong to one specific signing key and zone.
Rollback triggers
- Any authority serves missing or inconsistent DNSKEY/RRSIG data.
- Parent DS does not match the proven child key.
- Validating resolvers return SERVFAIL.
- The normal zone publisher can overwrite the signed configuration.
- No tested method exists to remove or replace the registrar DS promptly.